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IN THE SUPREME COURT
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STATE OF UTAH

MARK NASFELL,

Plaintiff,

Case No.
- vs-

7628
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a municipal corporation
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case came up for hearing upon stipulated facts
which are on file in this action:

1. That on July 12, 1950, an automobile owned by
Mark Nasfell and registered in his name was permitted to
remain in a space upon 24th Street in Ogden City, Weber
County, State of Utah, such street being part of State Highway 1189, within a parking meter zone, adjacent to which
parking meter 11157 was established.
2. That said vehicle was permitted to remain in said
space at a time when said meter 11157 displayed a signal
indicating that said space was illegally in use, between
the hours of 9:00 o'clock a.m. and 8:00 o'clock p.m. on
said day of July 12, 1950.
3. That at said time and place, and when said park·.
ing meter was so displaying the signal indicating that the
space was illegally in use, a police officer of Ogden City
placed upon the windshield Qf said vehicle a notice of
violation.
4. That thereafter, and on the 19th day of August,
1950, Ogden City caused a complaint to be issued and
filed with the Clerk of the Court of Ogden City, and after
the filing of said complaint, caused a summons to be
issued.
5. That said summons ordered the appellant Mark
Nasfell, to appear in the City Court of Ogden City on
August 25, 1950, to answer the charges in the complaint
theretofore filed. That said summons was served upon
2
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said appellant, Mark Nasfell, on the 22nd day of August,
1950.
6. That on the 25th day of August, 1950, as aforesaid, appellant entered his general appearance by his attorney, Hufh E. Dobbs, Esq., of the law firm of Dobbs
and Dobbs, who appear as appellant's counsel in connection with this action, and by said attorney entered a plea
of nnot fU i l ty" to said complaint.
7. That thereafter, and on the 7th day of November,
1950, such time being prior to any decision being rendered by the said City Court of Ogden City, appellant filed
this action for declaratory judgment, in the Second District
Court in and for Weber County, State of Utah.
8. That thereafter, and on the 20th day of November,
1950, the said District Court, upon motion of the respondent, for dismissal of the said action, rendered its order
dismissing the said action on the grounds that the complaint failed to state a claim against the respondent upon
which relief might be granted, and that it is from such
order that the appellant now appeals to this Court.
9. The action of respondent is based on the following Ordinances or part thereof as follows:
a.

Ordinance 1H54:

The General Parking
Meter Ordinance.

cc2. He shall attach to such vehicle a notice
that it has been parked in violation of this ordinance and instructing the owner or operator to
report at the Desk Sergeant's office at the Police
Department of the City of Ogden in regard to
such violation. Each such owner or operator
may, within twenty-four (24) hours after the time

3
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when such notice was attached to such vehicle,
pay to the Desk Sergeant or other officer in
charge at his office, in full satisfaction of such
violation the sum of fifty cents ($ . 50) which
shall be remitted by the Chief of Police to the
city treasurer.
''(k) Any person who shall violate any of the
provisions of this ordinance and any person who
aids, abets or assists therein, shall, upon conviction thereof, be subject to a fine of any
amount not exceeding Fifty Dollars ($50.) for
each offense or violation or be imprisoned in
the city jail for a term not exceeding one hundred
days, or both. A judgment that a fine be paid
for a violation of this ordinance shall provide
that the person against whom it is directed shall
in default of its payment serve one day in the
city jail for each $2.00 of the fine."
b. Ordinance 11543: An ordinance declaring
certain facts to be prima facie evidence of guilt
in connection with parking meter violations:
''An Ordinance of Ogden City amending Section
27G67 of the Revised Ordinances of Ogden City
Utah, 1933, relating to the responsibility of
owners of vehicles found illegally parked.
''Be it ordained by the Board of Commissioners
of Ogden City, Utah:
Section I. Section 27G67, Revised Ordinances
of Ogden City, Utah, 1933, is amended to read
as follows:
Section 27G67. Owner prima-facie responsible
for illegal parking. The presence of vehicle in

4
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or upon any public street or highway in Ogden
City stopped, standing or parking in violation of
any ordinance of Ogden City, shall be prima-facie
evidence that the person in whose name such
vehicle is registered as owner committed or
authorized the commission of such violation.
Section 2. In the opinion of the Board of Commissioners of Ogden City a public emergency exists with respect to the matter contained, and it
is necessary for the immediate peace, health and
preservation of the safety of Ogden City that this
ordinance shall take effect upon its adoption and
publication.
Section 3. This ordinance shall take effect upon
its adoption and publication.
Passed and adopted and ordered published by the
Board of Commissioners of Ogden City this 1st
day of March, 1950.
R. H. White, Mayor
Attest:
Elizabeth M. Tillotson,
City Recorder
Publish March 2, 1950."
STATEMENT OF POINTS

1. That Ogden City has neither an express or implied power to enact any ordinance which purports to determine what quantum of evidence shall be sufficient to
warrant the conviction of a person charged with an offense
against its ordinances.

5
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2. That the presumption, which such ordinance 6343
attempts to give the effect of evidence in such cause,
bears no such reasonable relationship to the question of
guilt of one charged with a breach of such ordinance by
illegal parking of a motor vehicle, as to raise any presumption of guilt in fact; and such ordinance in such respect is an unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of the police powers granted, with respect to control of public
streets and traffic thereon, to said Ogden City, and therefore unconstitutional.
3. That such ordinance, attempting to define the
quantum of evidence requisite to convict in a case arising
thereunder, upon a charge of unlawful parking in a restricted zone of said city, is an encroachment upon the
functions of the judiciary, and the state of legislature.
4. That the city has never received the authority
from the State Road Commission to place parking meters
upon Washington Boulevard and 24th Street in said city.
such streets being part of State Highways 89 and 87.
5. Appellant was not given due notice of any action
contemplated by the city until such time as he received a
summons issued by the city, and the practice of the city
in merely placing upon the windshield of a vehicle a, purported notice of violation is not sufficient notice, under
the laws of this state, to vest jurisdiction upon the city
court, nor to give the appellant notice that he should pay
a certain fine, and that in case he does not pay such fine
upon such notice he will be fined in a sum ten times the
amount that would have been assessed if he had received
the said ticket.

6
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THAT IT IS BEYOND THE POWER OF OGDEN
CITY TO PASS SUCH ORDINANCE 11343.
It is general law in this nation that the city has only
those powers as are given them directly by the constitution or statute or such powers as may be reasonably implied as being necessary in the enforcement of such
powers. This has been so held in literally scores of
cases, and it would be a waste of the court's time to cite
all such cases. A few on this point are:
(0 ~Bohn v. Salt Lake City-79 U 121; 8 P 2nd 591; (

81 A. L. R. 215.

1
·

Neldon v. Clark - 20 U 382, 59 P 524;
Orden City v. Bear Lake & River Waterworks &
Irrir. Co., 16 U 440; 52 P 697 41 L. R. A. 305;
\ City of Price v. Jaynes, et al. - 191 P(2) 606; --~Salt Lake City v. Bennion, 15 P (2) 648;
-1 in-tftr Rapid Transit Co. v. Orden City- 58 P (2) 1
---e-American Petroleum Co. v. Orden City, - 62 P(2)

557;
~-

_Walton v. Tracey Loan & Trust Co. -92 P (2) 724;
Salt Lake City v. Kusse, 93 P (2) 671
·
f Wadsworth v. Santaquin City - 28 P (2) 161;
---1? American Fork City v. Robinson - 292 P. 249;
Salt Lake City v. Sutter, 216 P 234;-2. Nance v. Mayflower Tavern - 150 P (2) 773;
-!---Salt Lake City v. Revene, - 124 P (2) 537;1·-TtJoele City v. Elkinrton, 116 P (2) 406

_ J./ -V'l,

All such cases cited being cases decided by this
court as to the powers of the cities and all such cases
limiting the cities as above set forth.
7 provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In this state the power of cities to regulate parking
1s found in Title 57, Chapter 7, Section 85, Utah Code
Annotated, 1943, and provides as follows:
"(a) The provisions of this act are intended to
confer upon local authorities the right of, and
shall not be deemed to deprive said authorities
of existing powers with respect to streets and
highways under their jurisdiction and within the
reasonable exercise of the police power; "
"( 1) Regulating the standing or parking of vehicles including the requirement for payment of a
parking fee which fee may vary in order to relieve
traffic congestion in designated areas. "

This is the only place under the Codes of this state
where the power to regulate parking by the city is found,
and it is beyond the perspective powers of counsel to see
where such a statute in the least implies a power to the
city to pass ordinances setting out the quantum of evidence which shall be sufficient to warrant the conviction
of a person charged of an offense under an ordinance
passed under the authority of the above quoted statute.
Nor can counsel find any other statute in the Codes
of this state, including the powers of police granted to
the cities, where an implication might be drawn granting
the city power to pass such an ordinance. The Courts of
this state are created by the constitution and by statutes
passed by the state legislature, and cities are not given
power of any sort over such courts, not even to the slightest degree, either expressly or impliedly •

.

In point with this argument and by way of comparison
consider the prima facie ordinance as concerns drunken
driving. The city of Ogden has been given the power to

8
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pass ordinances making it a misdemeanor to drive while
drunk, but before they presumed to pass an ordinance determining that a certai ~t alcoholic content in the blood of
a person arrested for drunken driving was prima facie evidence of such drunken driving they waited for the state
to pass such a statute. Now it is admitted that where the
state has acted on matters such as this, the city may act,
within certain limits, but in the case before us· the state
has failed to enact any law placing responsibility upon
the owner of an automobile under most circumstances.
Therefore it is felt by counsel that until the state legislature acts placing the responsibility contained in this
ordinance upon the owner of an automobile that the city
does not have the power, express or implied, to pass such
an ordinance as this.
It is therefore felt by counsel that the district court
erred in sustaining the respondent's motion as against
this part of the appellant's complaint in holding that the
city had the power to pass such an ordioance.
POINT II.
THAT SUCH ORDINANCE 11343 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES AND OF THE STATE OF UTAH IN
THAT IT DENIES HIM CERTAIN PRIVILEGES GRANTED HIM UNDER SUCH CONSTITUTIONS.
All defendants in criminal actions have two rights
which since the conception of Anglo-Saxon Law have
been granted him, these rights being: (1) the right to be
considered innocent of the crime with which he is charged
until it has been proven that he is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) that no law shall be passed which

9
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would require a defendant to take the witness stand on
his own behalf against his will. It is the contention of
counsel that both of these rights have been derogated by
ordinance *343.
In what way are these basic rights violated by this
ordinance? To determine this the ordinances must be
analyzed. This ordinance says that the mere fact of
ownership, and that fact alone, is enough without further
evidence on the part of the city attorney to set up a prima
facie presumption of guilt, in other words, the defendant
is guilty before he is proven so beyond a reasonable doubt.
The only method in which the defendant can combat this
presumption is by taking the stand in his own behalf, and
stating unequivocally that he did not so place the car in
the parking stand. Now it is common knowledge, and
therefore a matter of which this court could take judicial
knowledge, that no family man drives his automobile at
all times, in fact the matter is that in the majority of the
cases his wife or child drive it most of the time. Even
in the case of a single man there are many times in which
the car is driven by mechanics of the garage in which he
left it or by some friend. Now under these circumstances
can an owner of a vehicle state unequivocally, tel did not
place the vehicle in that parking stall"? The time in this
case must be considered. One month elapsed between the
time in which the records of the city show that a ticket
was placed upon the windshield of the appellant's auto·
mobile and the time in which he received a notice inform·
ing him of the fact. No man keeps a record which shows
that he drove the automobile on this day, that his wife
drove it on this day, little Johnnie drove it that day, and
this day it was in the garage being repaired. If this burden
10
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was placed upon him part of the convenience of his ownership of the automobile would be denied him. Yet under
this ordinance can he be put in jeopardy of committing
perjury by stating that he did not so park the automobile
when in fact he did hut did not remember doing so. Most
persons who possess automobiles are responsible citizens
of a community, and would rather pay the fine in connection with this law, no matter how unjust it may be,
than to take a chance on committing perjury. Now this
might be different if there were some assurance that he,
or the person who parked the automobile, as the case may
be, received the notice of violation therefore placing the
incident in his mind, but as will be discussed under Point
115 there is no assurance that the said notice is received.
It is obvious that the district court erred in upholding
this ordinance as constitutional. Here we have two substantive and vested rights being denied, by the promulgation of a clearly unreasonable and arbitrary ordinance.
An ordinance that says to the defendant, you are guilty
and will be considered so until you present the proof
which will make it appear that you are innocent, and the
only method in which you have of proving yourself innocent is to take the witness stand and make an unequivocal statement that you did not park the car in the parking
meter stall as you are charged with doing. What would be
the position of a defendant on the stand? Could he overcome the presumption of guilt by stating, nl don't believe I parked the car there", or nto the best of my knowledge I did not park the car there." No, I believe not.
His only method is to say ni did not park the car there."
As pointed out above in this brief a statement of that
sort, considering the passing of time and the lack of
11
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notice which would fix the date, time and circumstances
in the defendant's mind, would put him at a great risk of
committing perjury even though he did .not believe that he
parked the car there. It is felt by counsel, that unless
further protection than is given by this ordinance, is
given the defendants substantive rights are being abused,
and even destroyed.
This court in the case of State v. Potello ( 119 P.
1023, and the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in the case of
Simkins v. State, 249 P 168, have discussed what must
be found in a prima facie statute to take it out of the
range of the unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of the
police power of the state. Because of the limited power
of cities, discussed under Point I, the limits stated in
those cases are A fortiori when applied to municipal
ordinances.
POINT III.
THAT THE CITY IS ENCROACHING UPON THE
FUNCTIONS OF THE JUDICIARY, AND THE STATE
LEGISLATURE.
In the case of State v. Pote ll o, (supra) this court
held: "Should the Legislature declare, that, on mere
proof of a larceny and recent possession, in the accused,
and nothing more, a jury is required, or bound, to convict,
though it may not, on such evidence adduced, be con·
vinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt,
such legislation would be an encroachment upon the per·
ogatives of the judici~ry."
The Court then goes on to
point out that, with the additional requirement that the
defendant must have given some unsatisfactory account
12
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of how he came into possession of the property -- must
have lied about it in other words -- the defect is cured,
since to have stolen property in his possession, and to
tell some farfetched tale, which lacks indicia of truth
when asked to account for his possession, does create
a state of evidence upon which reasonable men might
conclude that the defendant was guilty.
Ogden City's ordinance stops just where the legislation, assumed in the language of the court in the
Pote llo case, stopped. It makes the mere ownership of
the car, and proof that the car was illegally parked by
someone, proof of the guilt of the owner. This clearly
then is an attempt by the city to impose upon the courts
pf this state a substantive rule of evidence, which the
state legislature, even with its much broader powers,
could not do under the language of the above quoted case,
without imposing upon the functions of the judiciary.
Even if this ordinance met the requirements of the
Pote llo case the city would not, under its limited powers,
be entitled to pass such a law. If this ordinance was
merely a procedural rule, and not substantive, as counsel
contends that it is, the city's attempt to pass such a rule
must fail. The Courts of this state are constituted by
the Constitution and by State Statute. In no place in the
Codes of this state is the power given to any city to
make rules concerning the courts. That power has been
found in many cases to be either in the Supreme Court of
the state or in the legislature. Though there is a conflict
as to which of the above branches has the power, there
is no conflict with fact that the city, unless such power
is given expressly or impliedly by statute, does not have

13
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any such power. It would seem that in the state of Utah
the Legislature has recognized the power of the Supreme
Court to make such rules by their enactment of Title 20,
Chapter 2, Section 410, Utah Code Annotated, 1943.
Therefore removing from the legislature the power to pass
procedural rules.
There is no doubt, if all requirements are met, that
the state legislature would have power to pass such a
substantive rule of evidence and thereby bind all the
Courts of this state by such a statute, but in this ordi·
nance we have an attempt by the City of Ogden to take
over the functions of the state legislature. It has been
stated before that in no place in the Codes of this state
have the cities of this state been granted any control over
the functioning of the courts, therefore, this ordinance
amounts to the fact that the city of Ogden has assumed a
power which has not been delegated to it. It must also be
stated that in any case arising in the City Court where an
appeal is taken from the judgment of such court to the
district court, the case being there tried De Novo, this
ordinance to be effective must be able to bind the district
court, and in an extreme case the Supreme Court. There·
fore we have an attempt by a body of government, which
is low on the scale of the legislative and administrative
branches of the government, a body constituted of merely
delegate powers, to dictate to a branch of government,
the judicial branch, a branch of which it is not even a
member.

I

The district court by its order, for which this appeal
is taken, impliedly held that the city of Ogden has the
right to pass an ordinance which will bind all the courts
of this state to a substantive rule of evidence, and also
14
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that it was within the power of the city to pass an ordinance setting forth this matter of substantive law.
This was clearly error on the part of the court as set
forth in the argument. It is clear that the city cannot,
under its limited powers, control the evidence, nor set
forth what shall be evidence in the courts of this state,
and it is clear also that where the state has not acted
specifically the city cannot act unless it can be found
that the city, under some of its stated powers, has the direct or implied power to pass such an ordinance.
POINT IV.
THAT THE CITY HAS NEVER RECEIVED AUTHORITY FROM THE STATE ROAD COMMISSION TO
PLACE PARKING METERS UPON STATE HIGHWAYS
WITHIN ITS BORDERS.
Title 57, Chapter 7, Section 84, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, states that uNo local authority shall enact
or enforce any· rule or regulation in conflict with the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act unless expressly authorized by such act". Section 88 (b) of the same Title and
Chapter states, ''no local authority shall place or maintain any traffic control device upon any highway under the
jurisdiction of the State Road Commission except by the
latter's permission." Washington Boulevard and 24th
Street, located in Ogden City, are state highways under
the jurisdiction of the State Road Commission. As a
matter of judicial notice it should be recognized by the
court that the City of Ogden has failed to receive such
permission from the State Road Commission.

15
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POINT V.
THAT THE PLAINTIFF, IN THIS ACTION, WAS.
NOT GIVEN DUE NOTICE OF ANY ACTION CONTEMPLATED BY THE CITY.
This point goes to the city court's jurisdiction. By
the stipulated facts in this case it will be found that the
only notice which the appellant herein received, prior to
service of summons upon him, was a so-called "ticket"
placed upon the windshield of his automobile. It is felt
by counsel herein that such a method is insufficient to
give the owner of an automobile notice of any action being
contemplated against him. Let us examine the procedure
here. If a person receives the so-called ccticket" and
pays his fine at that time the fine is $ .50, but if he does
not receive the so-called "ticket" and the city serves a
summons and complaint upon him the fine is then $5, or
a sum ten times as great. There are only three methods
of service of summons in this state, either by personal
service, by substituted service upon a p~rson at the residence or office of the defendant other than the defendant
himself, and service by publication. It is beyond the
powers of counsel to see under which category of service
this method of placing a ticket upon an empty automobile
will fall.
CONCLUSION
Under the above points it must be concluded that:
( 1) the City does not have the express or implied
powers to pass such an ordinance under the police power;
(2)

the ordinance has the effect of removing certain
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protections given a defendant by the Anglo-Saxon Law,
the Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution of the State of Utah; and
(3) such an ordinance is an encroachment by a body
of government, which has only delegated powers, upon the
functions of the judicial and legislative branches of the
government.
(4) that the city has received no authority to place
parking meters upon public highways, and
(5) chat the method used by the city in giving notice
of a violation is not sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the
City Court.

This court is therefore called upon to determine that
the district court erred in sustaining the motion of the
respondent as to all of the points above set out.
Respe:tfully submitted
HUGH E. DOBBS
of Dobbs & Dobbs
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